6 October 2026 Updated: 25 October 2026 8 min read

CVE-2026-73570: Zimbra Command Injection via SNMP Is Being Exploited - Update to 10.1.20 and Check for Compromise

A crafted email is enough: on Zimbra servers with the zimbra-snmp package and SNMP notifications enabled, attackers can execute commands as the zimbra user without authentication (CVE-2026-73570, CVSS 8.9). The vulnerability is being exploited and fixed in 10.1.20. The update, the workaround until then, and a check for web shells and persistence are necessary.

In Zimbra Collaboration (ZCS) before version 10.1.20, an unauthenticated attacker can execute operating system commands with the privileges of user zimbra if the optional package zimbra-snmp is installed and SNMP notifications are enabled. The trigger is a crafted SMTP request—that is, an email to the server—whose contents reach SNMP notification processing unfiltered. The vulnerability is identified as CVE-2026-73570 and has a CVSS score of 8.9. Zimbra reported it on June 26, 2026, and fixed it with version 10.1.20 on July 20, 2026. CERT Polska warned of an ongoing attack campaign on August 17, 2026; the U.S. agency CISA added the vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on August 21, 2026. The update is available.

Assistance with updating and assessment

If you need help securing, checking for compromise, or updating Zimbra Collaboration, please use the contact form on adeptio.ch. I can also respond on short notice.

Key points at a glance

FeatureDetails
AdvisoryZimbra Security Advisory of June 26, 2026 (temporary mitigation), fix in ZCS 10.1.20 of July 20, 2026
CVECVE-2026-73570, published August 13, 2026
RatingCVSS 3.1: 8.9 (high), AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L
Vulnerability typeOS command injection (CWE-78) in SNMP notification processing (swatchdog)
Prerequisiteno authentication; package zimbra-snmp installed, SNMP notifications enabled via snmp_notify, swatchdog service running
Affected versionsZCS before 10.1.20
Fixed versionsZCS 10.1.20 and later
Exploitationconfirmed by CERT Polska (report of August 17, 2026); CISA KEV since August 21, 2026
CISA deadline for U.S. federal agenciesAugust 24, 2026
WorkaroundDisable SNMP notifications or uninstall zimbra-snmp; restrict SNMP and SMTP to trusted hosts

Affected versions and updates

Release branchAffectedFixed
ZCS 10.110.1.x before 10.1.2010.1.20 and later
older branches (10.0, 9.0)yes, according to NVD all versions before 10.1.20no fixed version stated in the sources (as of October 6, 2026); migrate to 10.1.20 or later

Only installations where zimbra-snmp is installed and SNMP notifications are enabled are affected. According to CERT Polska, the swatchdog service that processes notifications runs by default. Without zimbra-snmp, a server is not vulnerable through this path according to the advisory description; in addition, the update to 10.1.20 fixes other vulnerabilities (XSS in the Classic Web Client, bypass of forwarding restrictions, SSRF in the Nextcloud integration, access controls in EWS and mailbox delegation), so it makes sense even without SNMP. Version 10.1.21 has been current since September 24, 2026. It does not change anything regarding CVE-2026-73570, but closes additional vulnerabilities, including predictable password recovery codes that allowed an unauthenticated attacker to reset passwords. Those updating can therefore upgrade directly to 10.1.21.

The installed version is displayed by zmcontrol -v as user zimbra (release number, build, platform, and build date according to the Zimbra Wiki):

su - zimbra
zmcontrol -v

Whether the vulnerable configuration is active can be checked as follows according to SecureLayer7’s analysis:

su - zimbra
zmlocalconfig snmp_notify
zmswatchctl status
grep dosnmp /opt/zimbra/conf/swatchrc
Options explained
OptionEffect
su - zimbraswitches to user zimbra with that user’s environment
zmlocalconfig snmp_notifydisplays the value of the snmp_notify parameter; true means SNMP notifications are enabled
zmswatchctl statusshows whether swatchdog is running
grep dosnmp /opt/zimbra/conf/swatchrcshows the location in the generated swatchdog configuration where the SNMP notification is triggered

If snmp_notify is set to true and swatchdog is active, the server is vulnerable when running a version before 10.1.20.

What is known about exploitation

Microsoft describes the flow as follows: swatchdog monitors /var/log/zimbra.log and triggers an SNMP trap when service statuses change. Shell metacharacters enter this processing through a crafted SMTP request; when a status changes, swatchdog incorporates the attacker-controlled value into a call to snmptrap, which runs through a shell. The commands run with the privileges of the zimbra service account.

Timeline according to the sources:

  1. June 26, 2026: Zimbra reports the vulnerability in a security advisory with a temporary mitigation.

  2. July 20, 2026: ZCS 10.1.20 is released with the permanent fix.

  3. July 28 to August 7, 2026: Microsoft observes probing of the injection point using two different tools.

  4. August 13, 2026: The CVE entry is published.

  5. August 17, 2026: CERT Polska warns of an ongoing campaign and publishes assessment guidance.

  6. August 21, 2026: CISA adds the vulnerability to the KEV catalog, with a deadline of August 24, 2026.

  7. September 30, 2026: Microsoft publishes an analysis of the attacks with indicators.

According to Help Net Security, the Shadowserver Foundation counted 155 compromised Zimbra instances on the internet on August 20, 2026, rising to 274 a few days later. More than 8,200 instances had not been updated at that time, although not all have the vulnerable SNMP configuration.

Following exploitation, according to Microsoft, attackers placed JSP web shells in several Jetty and mailboxd directories, established persistence through a systemd service, Cron entries, and SSH keys, and gained root privileges by modifying the PAM configuration. They used zmlocalconfig -s to read credentials, queried the zimbraPreAuthKey, zimbraAuthTokenKey, and zimbraTwoFactorAuthSecret attributes via LDAP, archived the mail store using tar, and attempted exfiltration to Azure Blob Storage via AzCopy; whether the transfer was completed is not confirmed according to Microsoft. Microsoft also identifies a coin miner. The parties behind the attacks are unknown.

Immediate measures

  1. Determine the version and configuration using zmcontrol -v, zmlocalconfig snmp_notify, and zmswatchctl status (see above).

  2. Check for compromise and preserve logs before making changes so that analysis remains possible (see the next section).

  3. Update to ZCS 10.1.20 or later. Zimbra, CERT Polska, CISA, and Microsoft all recommend this. Installations on older branches must migrate to 10.1.20 or later.

  4. Implement the workaround until updating: Microsoft recommends uninstalling package zimbra-snmp or disabling SNMP notifications. The commands are listed below.

  5. Reduce exposure: According to Microsoft, restrict SNMP and SMTP to trusted hosts insofar as mail operations permit. SMTP remains reachable on an MTA that receives email from the internet; there, the update or workaround are the effective measures.

To disable SNMP notifications, SecureLayer7 provides the following commands as user zimbra:

zmlocalconfig -e snmp_notify=false
zmswatchctl stop
Options explained
OptionEffect
zmlocalconfig -e snmp_notify=falsesets parameter snmp_notify to false in the local configuration and disables SNMP notifications
zmswatchctl stopstops the swatchdog service

Afterward, SNMP traps will be missing when services fail; monitoring should be performed another way until the update.

Checking for compromise

The vulnerability was exploited before many systems were updated. An update to 10.1.20 closes the attack path but does not remove web shells, systemd services, or SSH keys that have already been placed. Microsoft explicitly recommends searching for redundant persistence and rotating Zimbra authentication keys.

Logs and directories according to CERT Polska

CERT Polska names two checks:

  1. /var/log/zimbra.log for entries in the form Service status change: [Payload] changed from stopped to running or changed from running to stopped, where conspicuous strings appear in place of the service name.

  2. Files created by user zimbra in the past 30 days in /opt/zimbra/jetty/webapps/, /opt/zimbra/jetty_base/webapps/, and /tmp/. Hive Security suggests:

find /opt/zimbra/jetty/webapps /opt/zimbra/jetty_base/webapps /tmp -user zimbra -mtime -30 -ls
Options explained
OptionEffect
-user zimbraonly files owned by user zimbra
-mtime -30only files modified in the past 30 days
-lsoutputs details such as permissions, owner, size, and timestamps

Because the attacks began as early as late July according to Microsoft, a period longer than 30 days may be appropriate.

Additional traces according to Microsoft

AreaWhat to check
Web shellsJSP files and compiled artifacts (*_jsp.java) in paths jetty_base/webapps/, jetty/webapps/, mailboxd/webapps/, and work/zimbra/jsp/ under /opt/zimbra
systemdService zimlog.service in /etc/systemd/system/, plus units with unexpected ownership, activation status, or timestamps
CronEntries containing * * * * * or @reboot
SSHChanges to authorized_keys, access to /opt/zimbra/.ssh/zimbra_identity
Privilege escalationChanges to /etc/pam.d/sudo, NOPASSWD entries in /etc/sudoers.d/, zmmailboxd.out as a symbolic link to a PAM configuration
Data exfiltrationArchive /opt/zimbra/final.tar.gz, download of AzCopy
ProcessesCalls to snmptrap followed by shell metacharacters and a call to wget or curl, ending with a # comment

Network indicators

The addresses are redacted as in the Microsoft analysis.

IndicatorMeaning according to Microsoft
117.107.25[.]243:7071C2 for the dropper, delivers de.sh
192.255.193[.]111:9004C2 of the coin miner
psk1zim[.]abrdns[.]com/agentwsWebSocket channel of zimclient2
transzimbra[.]linkpc[.]netC2 for the dropper

File hashes (SHA-256)

FileSHA-256
de.shdee5af1c0f76b45d28bafd6e60c07bb8e391d98addf81ef8f13d073acdb3c48a
agent2.sh6ab7de2509038edf580aef6229c1c3db17f4da8f2d7d940818faf617d1938244
zimdown2bf28f38122bf20d5fac969cc414daa6a890cdea872d389ca93d2092b6b7773cf
zimclient2b594a42b8f1c6f090327bb9a3361c2d3515537fb7ac8da6b9061b9a3f330e159

If you find evidence

A hit means the system is considered compromised. Preserve logs and affected files before deleting anything. Because the attackers gained root privileges and established persistence in multiple locations according to Microsoft, rebuilding on 10.1.20 or later is safer than removing individual files. Then rotate the extracted secrets: the values from zmlocalconfig -s (including LDAP and database passwords), zimbraPreAuthKey, zimbraAuthTokenKey, and the SSH keys of user zimbra. According to Microsoft, zimbraTwoFactorAuthSecret was also queried; users’ two-factor registrations should therefore be set up again. In multi-server installations, the assessment applies to all nodes, because attackers identified mailbox and MTA servers using zmprov and used the SSH key to move between servers according to Microsoft.

Assessment

Affected organizations are those that operate Zimbra as their own mail server and accept mail directly from the internet. The vulnerability is reachable through normal mail reception, without authentication and without any user interaction. The limitation to zimbra-snmp with notifications enabled reduces the number of attackable systems; however, anyone who has configured SNMP monitoring is in precisely this configuration. According to SecurityWeek, CISA lists 18 Zimbra vulnerabilities in the KEV catalog, four of them from 2026; previous campaigns against Zimbra have been attributed to state-backed groups and financially motivated criminals. CERT-FR reported the vulnerability on August 19, 2026, together with three other CVEs fixed in Zimbra. No NCSC Switzerland report on CVE-2026-73570 was available during research.

Change log

  • October 25, 2026: Added: Zimbra 10.1.21 has been available since September 24, 2026 and closes additional vulnerabilities, including predictable password recovery codes; an update can be performed directly to this version.

Sources

  1. Zimbra: Security Advisories

    entry on command injection in SNMP monitoring, fixed in 10.1.20.

    https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Zimbra_Security_Advisories
  2. Zimbra Blog: Patch Release Update: Zimbra 10.1.20

    release of July 20, 2026, permanent fix for the vulnerability reported on June 26, 2026.

    https://blog.zimbra.com/2026/07/patch-release-update-zimbra-10-1-20/
  3. Zimbra: Zimbra Releases/10.1.20

    release notes with all security fixes in the version.

    https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Zimbra_Releases/10.1.20
  4. NVD: CVE-2026-73570

    description, CVSS vector, CWE-78, affected versions, KEV data.

    https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73570
  5. CISA: CISA Adds One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog
  6. CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, CVE-2026-73570
  7. CERT Polska: Aktywnie wykorzystywana podatność w Zimbra Collaboration Suite

    warning of August 17, 2026, with prerequisites and guidance for checking logs and directories.

    https://moje.cert.pl/komunikaty/2026/145/aktywnie-wykorzystywana-podatnosc-w-zimbra-collaboration-suite/
  8. Microsoft Security Blog: Unauthenticated command injection on internet-facing mail servers: tracking CVE-2026-73570
  9. CERT-FR: CERTFR-2026-AVI-1041

    advisory of August 19, 2026, on several vulnerabilities in Zimbra before 10.1.20.

    https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/avis/CERTFR-2026-AVI-1041/
  10. HKCERT: Zimbra Multiple Vulnerabilities

    bulletin with affected versions and a note on active exploitation.

    https://www.hkcert.org/security-bulletin/zimbra-multiple-vulnerabilities_20260824
  11. SecureLayer7: CVE-2026-73570: Zimbra Swatchdog SNMP Command Injection

    technical analysis of the cause, commands for assessment and workaround.

    https://blog.securelayer7.net/cve-2026-73570-zimbra-command-injection/
  12. Hive Security: Zimbra CVE-2026-73570: Patch the Mail Server, Then Prove It Wasn’t Already Owned
  13. Help Net Security: Unpatched Zimbra servers are falling to CVE-2026-73570 attacks

    Shadowserver Foundation figures on compromised and non-updated instances.

    https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/08/25/zimbra-cve-2026-73570-compromised/
  14. The Hacker News: Attackers Exploit Zimbra SNMP Flaw for Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution

    summary with the KEV deadline and assessment guidance from CERT Polska.

    https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/attackers-exploit-zimbra-snmp-flaw-for.html
  15. BleepingComputer: Critical Zimbra RCE flaw now actively exploited in attacks

    report on exploitation and the number of internet-accessible Zimbra servers.

    https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/critical-zimbra-rce-flaw-now-actively-exploited-in-attacks/
  16. SecurityWeek: Hackers Target Zimbra Servers in Active Exploitation Campaign

    context including the number of Zimbra vulnerabilities in the KEV catalog.

    https://www.securityweek.com/hackers-target-zimbra-servers-in-active-exploitation-campaign/
  17. Zimbra Wiki: Zmcontrol

    documentation for zmcontrol -v version queries.

    https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Zmcontrol
  18. Zimbra: Zimbra Releases/10.1.21

    release notes for the version of September 24, 2026, with additional security fixes.

    https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Zimbra_Releases/10.1.21

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