CVE-2026-73570: Zimbra Command Injection via SNMP Is Being Exploited - Update to 10.1.20 and Check for Compromise
A crafted email is enough: on Zimbra servers with the zimbra-snmp package and SNMP notifications enabled, attackers can execute commands as the zimbra user without authentication (CVE-2026-73570, CVSS 8.9). The vulnerability is being exploited and fixed in 10.1.20. The update, the workaround until then, and a check for web shells and persistence are necessary.
In Zimbra Collaboration (ZCS) before version 10.1.20, an unauthenticated attacker can execute operating system commands with the privileges of user zimbra if the optional package zimbra-snmp is installed and SNMP notifications are enabled. The trigger is a crafted SMTP request—that is, an email to the server—whose contents reach SNMP notification processing unfiltered. The vulnerability is identified as CVE-2026-73570 and has a CVSS score of 8.9. Zimbra reported it on June 26, 2026, and fixed it with version 10.1.20 on July 20, 2026. CERT Polska warned of an ongoing attack campaign on August 17, 2026; the U.S. agency CISA added the vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on August 21, 2026. The update is available.
Assistance with updating and assessment
If you need help securing, checking for compromise, or updating Zimbra Collaboration, please use the contact form on adeptio.ch. I can also respond on short notice.
Key points at a glance
| Feature | Details |
|---|---|
| Advisory | Zimbra Security Advisory of June 26, 2026 (temporary mitigation), fix in ZCS 10.1.20 of July 20, 2026 |
| CVE | CVE-2026-73570, published August 13, 2026 |
| Rating | CVSS 3.1: 8.9 (high), AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L |
| Vulnerability type | OS command injection (CWE-78) in SNMP notification processing (swatchdog) |
| Prerequisite | no authentication; package zimbra-snmp installed, SNMP notifications enabled via snmp_notify, swatchdog service running |
| Affected versions | ZCS before 10.1.20 |
| Fixed versions | ZCS 10.1.20 and later |
| Exploitation | confirmed by CERT Polska (report of August 17, 2026); CISA KEV since August 21, 2026 |
| CISA deadline for U.S. federal agencies | August 24, 2026 |
| Workaround | Disable SNMP notifications or uninstall zimbra-snmp; restrict SNMP and SMTP to trusted hosts |
Affected versions and updates
| Release branch | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
| ZCS 10.1 | 10.1.x before 10.1.20 | 10.1.20 and later |
| older branches (10.0, 9.0) | yes, according to NVD all versions before 10.1.20 | no fixed version stated in the sources (as of October 6, 2026); migrate to 10.1.20 or later |
Only installations where zimbra-snmp is installed and SNMP notifications are enabled are affected. According to CERT Polska, the swatchdog service that processes notifications runs by default. Without zimbra-snmp, a server is not vulnerable through this path according to the advisory description; in addition, the update to 10.1.20 fixes other vulnerabilities (XSS in the Classic Web Client, bypass of forwarding restrictions, SSRF in the Nextcloud integration, access controls in EWS and mailbox delegation), so it makes sense even without SNMP. Version 10.1.21 has been current since September 24, 2026. It does not change anything regarding CVE-2026-73570, but closes additional vulnerabilities, including predictable password recovery codes that allowed an unauthenticated attacker to reset passwords. Those updating can therefore upgrade directly to 10.1.21.
The installed version is displayed by zmcontrol -v as user zimbra (release number, build, platform, and build date according to the Zimbra Wiki):
su - zimbra
zmcontrol -v
Whether the vulnerable configuration is active can be checked as follows according to SecureLayer7’s analysis:
su - zimbra
zmlocalconfig snmp_notify
zmswatchctl status
grep dosnmp /opt/zimbra/conf/swatchrc
If snmp_notify is set to true and swatchdog is active, the server is vulnerable when running a version before 10.1.20.
What is known about exploitation
Microsoft describes the flow as follows: swatchdog monitors /var/log/zimbra.log and triggers an SNMP trap when service statuses change. Shell metacharacters enter this processing through a crafted SMTP request; when a status changes, swatchdog incorporates the attacker-controlled value into a call to snmptrap, which runs through a shell. The commands run with the privileges of the zimbra service account.
Timeline according to the sources:
-
June 26, 2026: Zimbra reports the vulnerability in a security advisory with a temporary mitigation.
-
July 20, 2026: ZCS 10.1.20 is released with the permanent fix.
-
July 28 to August 7, 2026: Microsoft observes probing of the injection point using two different tools.
-
August 13, 2026: The CVE entry is published.
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August 17, 2026: CERT Polska warns of an ongoing campaign and publishes assessment guidance.
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August 21, 2026: CISA adds the vulnerability to the KEV catalog, with a deadline of August 24, 2026.
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September 30, 2026: Microsoft publishes an analysis of the attacks with indicators.
According to Help Net Security, the Shadowserver Foundation counted 155 compromised Zimbra instances on the internet on August 20, 2026, rising to 274 a few days later. More than 8,200 instances had not been updated at that time, although not all have the vulnerable SNMP configuration.
Following exploitation, according to Microsoft, attackers placed JSP web shells in several Jetty and mailboxd directories, established persistence through a systemd service, Cron entries, and SSH keys, and gained root privileges by modifying the PAM configuration. They used zmlocalconfig -s to read credentials, queried the zimbraPreAuthKey, zimbraAuthTokenKey, and zimbraTwoFactorAuthSecret attributes via LDAP, archived the mail store using tar, and attempted exfiltration to Azure Blob Storage via AzCopy; whether the transfer was completed is not confirmed according to Microsoft. Microsoft also identifies a coin miner. The parties behind the attacks are unknown.
Immediate measures
-
Determine the version and configuration using
zmcontrol -v,zmlocalconfig snmp_notify, andzmswatchctl status(see above). -
Check for compromise and preserve logs before making changes so that analysis remains possible (see the next section).
-
Update to ZCS 10.1.20 or later. Zimbra, CERT Polska, CISA, and Microsoft all recommend this. Installations on older branches must migrate to 10.1.20 or later.
-
Implement the workaround until updating: Microsoft recommends uninstalling package
zimbra-snmpor disabling SNMP notifications. The commands are listed below. -
Reduce exposure: According to Microsoft, restrict SNMP and SMTP to trusted hosts insofar as mail operations permit. SMTP remains reachable on an MTA that receives email from the internet; there, the update or workaround are the effective measures.
To disable SNMP notifications, SecureLayer7 provides the following commands as user zimbra:
zmlocalconfig -e snmp_notify=false
zmswatchctl stop
Afterward, SNMP traps will be missing when services fail; monitoring should be performed another way until the update.
Checking for compromise
The vulnerability was exploited before many systems were updated. An update to 10.1.20 closes the attack path but does not remove web shells, systemd services, or SSH keys that have already been placed. Microsoft explicitly recommends searching for redundant persistence and rotating Zimbra authentication keys.
Logs and directories according to CERT Polska
CERT Polska names two checks:
-
/var/log/zimbra.logfor entries in the formService status change: [Payload] changed from stopped to runningorchanged from running to stopped, where conspicuous strings appear in place of the service name. -
Files created by user
zimbrain the past 30 days in/opt/zimbra/jetty/webapps/,/opt/zimbra/jetty_base/webapps/, and/tmp/. Hive Security suggests:
find /opt/zimbra/jetty/webapps /opt/zimbra/jetty_base/webapps /tmp -user zimbra -mtime -30 -ls
Because the attacks began as early as late July according to Microsoft, a period longer than 30 days may be appropriate.
Additional traces according to Microsoft
| Area | What to check |
|---|---|
| Web shells | JSP files and compiled artifacts (*_jsp.java) in paths jetty_base/webapps/, jetty/webapps/, mailboxd/webapps/, and work/zimbra/jsp/ under /opt/zimbra |
| systemd | Service zimlog.service in /etc/systemd/system/, plus units with unexpected ownership, activation status, or timestamps |
| Cron | Entries containing * * * * * or @reboot |
| SSH | Changes to authorized_keys, access to /opt/zimbra/.ssh/zimbra_identity |
| Privilege escalation | Changes to /etc/pam.d/sudo, NOPASSWD entries in /etc/sudoers.d/, zmmailboxd.out as a symbolic link to a PAM configuration |
| Data exfiltration | Archive /opt/zimbra/final.tar.gz, download of AzCopy |
| Processes | Calls to snmptrap followed by shell metacharacters and a call to wget or curl, ending with a # comment |
Network indicators
The addresses are redacted as in the Microsoft analysis.
| Indicator | Meaning according to Microsoft |
|---|---|
117.107.25[.]243:7071 | C2 for the dropper, delivers de.sh |
192.255.193[.]111:9004 | C2 of the coin miner |
psk1zim[.]abrdns[.]com/agentws | WebSocket channel of zimclient2 |
transzimbra[.]linkpc[.]net | C2 for the dropper |
File hashes (SHA-256)
| File | SHA-256 |
|---|---|
de.sh | dee5af1c0f76b45d28bafd6e60c07bb8e391d98addf81ef8f13d073acdb3c48a |
agent2.sh | 6ab7de2509038edf580aef6229c1c3db17f4da8f2d7d940818faf617d1938244 |
zimdown2 | bf28f38122bf20d5fac969cc414daa6a890cdea872d389ca93d2092b6b7773cf |
zimclient2 | b594a42b8f1c6f090327bb9a3361c2d3515537fb7ac8da6b9061b9a3f330e159 |
If you find evidence
A hit means the system is considered compromised. Preserve logs and affected files before deleting anything. Because the attackers gained root privileges and established persistence in multiple locations according to Microsoft, rebuilding on 10.1.20 or later is safer than removing individual files. Then rotate the extracted secrets: the values from zmlocalconfig -s (including LDAP and database passwords), zimbraPreAuthKey, zimbraAuthTokenKey, and the SSH keys of user zimbra. According to Microsoft, zimbraTwoFactorAuthSecret was also queried; users’ two-factor registrations should therefore be set up again. In multi-server installations, the assessment applies to all nodes, because attackers identified mailbox and MTA servers using zmprov and used the SSH key to move between servers according to Microsoft.
Assessment
Affected organizations are those that operate Zimbra as their own mail server and accept mail directly from the internet. The vulnerability is reachable through normal mail reception, without authentication and without any user interaction. The limitation to zimbra-snmp with notifications enabled reduces the number of attackable systems; however, anyone who has configured SNMP monitoring is in precisely this configuration. According to SecurityWeek, CISA lists 18 Zimbra vulnerabilities in the KEV catalog, four of them from 2026; previous campaigns against Zimbra have been attributed to state-backed groups and financially motivated criminals. CERT-FR reported the vulnerability on August 19, 2026, together with three other CVEs fixed in Zimbra. No NCSC Switzerland report on CVE-2026-73570 was available during research.
Change log
- October 25, 2026: Added: Zimbra 10.1.21 has been available since September 24, 2026 and closes additional vulnerabilities, including predictable password recovery codes; an update can be performed directly to this version.
Comments
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