EPFL École polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne
epfl.ch
- Industry
- Universities & research
- Headquarters
- Lausanne, Vaud
- Type
- public
- Employees (approx.)
- 6,500
- Checked on
- 19 October 2026
Protection against forged senders: largely protected, with a gap: subdomains not protected (sp=none)
Points per criterion
- MX 10 / 10
- SPF 13 / 15
- DKIM 20 / 20
- DMARC 19 / 25
- DNSSEC 0 / 10
- Transport (MTA-STS/DANE) 0 / 15
- TLS-RPT 0 / 5
- Industry avg.: 57.9 ▲ 4.1
- Canton avg.: 58.5 ▲ 3.5
- Overall avg.: 53.5 ▲ 8.5
- Rank 20 of 58 in the industry
Findings
-
!SPF authorises very large IP ranges (428,182)
The SPF record itself lists IPv4 ranges with more than 65,000 addresses. The wider the range, the easier it is for third parties to send from an authorised network.
-
!Subdomains unprotected (sp=none)
The main domain is protected, but subdomains such as invoice.company.ch can still be forged.
-
!DMARC without reporting (no rua)
Without aggregate reports it stays invisible who sends in the domain's name.
-
!DKIM key below 2048 bits
RSA-1024 is considered too weak (RFC 8301, M3AAWG). Rotate to 2048-bit keys.
-
!DNSSEC not enabled
Without DNSSEC, DNS answers can be forged in transit. DANE requires DNSSEC.
-
!No MTA-STS
Without MTA-STS (or DANE) inbound encryption is not enforced; an attacker on the path can downgrade to plain text.
-
!No TLS reporting (TLS-RPT)
Without TLS-RPT the organisation does not learn when senders fail to deliver encrypted.
-
iStrict DMARC alignment
adkim=s or aspf=s requires exact domain matches. Secure, but demanding when sending from subdomains.
Who runs the mail?
- Mailbox provider
- Microsoft 365
- Provider jurisdiction
- USA · MX: US
- Detection confidence
- 84 / 100
- Microsoft tenant
- Managed · epfl.ch
- Tenant region
- EU
Signals (5)
| MX | Microsoft 365 | epfl-ch.mail.protection.outlook.com |
|---|---|---|
| DKIM | Microsoft 365 | selector1 → selector1-epfl-ch._domainkey.epflch.onmicrosoft.com |
| Network | Microsoft 365 | AS8075 MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation |
| DKIM | Google Workspace | google |
| Entra ID | Microsoft 365 | Entra-ID-Tenant (Managed) |
MX servers
| Pref | Host | IP | Network | Country | TLSA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 50 | epfl-ch.mail.protection.outlook.com | 52.101.73.153 | AS8075 MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation | US | – |
52.101.185.24 | AS8075 MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation | US | |||
52.101.73.120 | AS8075 MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation | US |
SPF
v=spf1 redirect=_spf.epfl.ch- all
~all- DNS lookups
- 5 / 10
- Includes
_spf.epfl.ch_spf1.epfl.ch- IPv4
- 428,182 addresses authorised directly
DMARC
v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;sp=none;fo=0;aspf=s;adkim=s- Policy
- p=quarantine
- Subdomains (sp)
- none
- Share (pct)
- 100 %
- Alignment DKIM/SPF
- strict / strict
- Aggregate reports (rua)
- –
DKIM
| Selector | Key | delegated to |
|---|---|---|
cm | RSA 1024 | – |
google | RSA 1024 | – |
k2 | RSA 2048 | dkim2.mcsv.net |
k3 | RSA 2048 | dkim3.mcsv.net |
mailjet | RSA 1024 | – |
mandrill | RSA 1024 | – |
selector1 | RSA 1024 | selector1-epfl-ch._domainkey.epflch.onmicrosoft.com |
selector2 | RSA 1024 | selector2-epfl-ch._domainkey.epflch.onmicrosoft.com |
Checked: 100 common selectors. Keys under custom selectors remain invisible.
Transport encryption
- MTA-STS
- missing
- DANE
- missing
- DNSSEC
- missing
- TLS-RPT
- missing
- BIMI
- missing
History
- Score 62 · DMARC quarantine
Raw data
epfl.ch. IN MX 50 epfl-ch.mail.protection.outlook.com.
epfl.ch. IN TXT "v=spf1 redirect=_spf.epfl.ch"
_dmarc.epfl.ch. IN TXT "v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;sp=none;fo=0;aspf=s;adkim=s"